Alterity and Facticity: New Perspectives on Husserl by Vincenzo Costa (auth.), Natalie Depraz, Dan Zahavi (eds.)

By Vincenzo Costa (auth.), Natalie Depraz, Dan Zahavi (eds.)

Husserl's phenomenology has usually been criticized for its Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic and solipsistic nature. this day, this frequent interpretation needs to be considered as being superseded, because it supplies yet a truly partial and restricted photo of Husserl's pondering. the ongoing e-book of Husserl's study manuscripts has disclosed analyses that have made it essential to revise and adjust a couple of regular readings.
This anthology records the new improvement in Husserl study. It comprises contributions from a few younger phenomenologists, who've all defended their dissertation on Husserl within the nineties, and it provides a brand new form of interpretation which emphasizes the scale of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in Husserl's thinking.

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38 NATALIE DEPRAZ Such a subtle and plastic passivity can be further differentiated from within: it includes different modes of temporalization which contribute intrinsically to that plasticity. The primary temporalizing begins with the hyletic affective Anstofi, which is constitutive for (if not constitutive of) time. My contention is that this hyletic affection has a constitutive role to play in the fulfilment of temporality: it has a part to in the process of constitution as a motivating impulse.

Moreover, amongst phenomenologists it is Sartre who makes the most of this distinction. In the light of this distinction, the very possibility of a passive imagination seems to be excluded. Before we can even attempt to demonstrate the phenomenological possibility of a passive imagination, we first need to clear the ground by showing how un-phenomenological this distinction really is. A. Passivity of perception/Activity of imagination Seen from the standpoint of the static phenomenology of presentifications (Vergegenwiirtigungen), perception, as a primary act supported by an originally intuitive mode of givenness, founds (fundiert) imagination.

Such a difference between passion and affection (alias emotion) can be traced back to Kant's Anthropology (third Part, B). 49. , § 149, and Hua 5/331, §7. 50. See Hua 23, especially the texts nO 18, 19 and 20. These texts date from the early twenties. 51. See Hua 16, n014 and n021. 52. See Bernet, 1996 and Depraz, 1996a. 53. , n020, where imaginary life is said to be a passive life. 54. See Hua 23/504, n018 a. 55. See Hua 23, n018 a and b, and n020. 56. At the end of this paper, I would like to thank Sylvio Senn and Violeta Miskievitz, whose rich and valuable insights helped me in my investigation of a truly phenomenological passive imagination.

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